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A note on terminology
 
 
This paper is the fifth in a series of country briefing papers 
released in 2012 about the online support of populist political 
parties and street-based groups in Europe. These papers are 
based on a dataset of approximately 10,667 Facebook 
supporters of these ‘nationalist populist’ parties in 11 
European countries, which was published in the Demos report 
The New Face of Digital Populism, released in November 2011.1 
Further papers will be released throughout 2012. 
Throughout this paper, we refer to two primary datasets 
by the following terminology:
Lega Nord: The primary data source used in this report is a 
survey of 838 Facebook supporters of the Lega Nord, collected 
by Demos during July and August 2011. All references to Lega 
Nord supporters refer to this group unless otherwise stated.
Populist parties and movements (PPAMs): In order to draw 
comparisons between Lega Nord Facebook supporters and the 
Facebook supporters of nationalist populist parties elsewhere 
in Europe, throughout this paper we refer to the data set 
collected for The New Face of Digital Populism. This includes 
10,667 Facebook supporters of nationalist populist parties and 
movements in 11 Western European countries. We refer to these 
as PPAMs throughout.
We do not claim that the respondents of this survey are 
representative of either Lega Nord party members or voters. 
This sample consists of social media supporters of the party. 
We are interested primarily in who these individuals are, what 
motivates and concerns them, and how far their political 
activism encompasses offline and online engagement.
We also draw on European-wide survey data from a 
Eurobarometer survey and the European Values Study to make 
comparisons where possible. These studies are cited where 
relevant below.
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Executive summary 
The last decade has witnessed a growth in populist parties and 
movements (PPAMs) across Western Europe. Many of these 
parties are defined by their opposition to multiculturalism, and 
concern for protecting national and European culture, 
particularly from the supposed effects of Muslim immigration. 
On economic policy, they are often vocal critics of 
globalisation, which is held to be an elite-driven, anti-
democratic project. Similar claims tend to be voiced about the 
European Union and the integration process. These concerns 
are expressed via an ‘anti-establishment’ rhetoric used to 
appeal to disillusionment with mainstream political parties, 
the media and government. Populists thus posit themselves as 
the defenders of a ‘good’ people against threats from above 
(economic, political and cultural elites at national, continental 
and global levels) and below (immigrants and others 
considered not part of ‘the people’). Often termed ‘radical 
right’ or ‘the new right’, these parties in reality do not fit easily 
into traditional political divides.
The Lega Nord is the oldest party group in the Italian 
parliament, and has enjoyed considerable political success: the 
party has been in government three times, including for eight 
of the last 11 years. It held several key ministries in the 
coalition government led by Silvio Berlusconi until November 
2011. Since then, according to opinion polls, the party has seen 
a decline in support, partly driven by scandals surrounding the 
leadership. Long-team leader Umberto Bossi resigned in April 
2012, and the party is now led by former Minister of the 
Interior, Roberto Maroni. 
Nonetheless, the Lega Nord is likely to remain a 
significant force in Italian politics. It is a party with a clear 
ideology and unique policy offer, backed by a well-structured 
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the crisis and the change in government, it is also now 
extremely doubtful whether the Lega’s key policy goal of fiscal 
federalism will be implemented, despite this having been 
approved during the party’s time in government from 2008 to 
2011. On the plus side for the Lega, the crisis may well make 
the public more open to its Eurosceptic appeals.
This report presents the results of a survey of 838 
responses from Facebook fans of the Lega Nord. It includes 
data on who they are, what they think, and what motivates 
them to shift from virtual to real-world activism.
In July 2011 we targeted adverts at individuals who were 
supporters of Lega Nord related groups on Facebook. On 
clicking the advert, individuals were redirected to a survey, 
which they were invited to complete. The survey and adverts 
were presented in Italian, and were then translated back into 
English for the purposes of this report. The data were then 
weighted in order to improve the validity and accuracy of any 
inferences made about the online population. Although online 
recruitment in social research is widespread, self-select 
recruitment via social network sites brings novel challenges. 
Because this is an innovative research method, with both 
strengths and weaknesses, we have included a methodology 
section in an annex to this report.
Results
The Lega Nord’s support base cannot be adequately 
understood through Facebook alone, and many Lega Nord 
supporters are of course not on Facebook. The findings in this 
report refer specifically to Lega Nord Facebook 
supporters — an important, but specific, sub-group of its 
overall support base. As we set out in the methodology (in the 
annex), this study is more exploratory than comprehensive, 
but does shed important and useful light on this group. It is 
with these caveats that the results are presented:
 · Lega Nord Facebook supporters are predominantly young and 
male. Over three-quarters (78 per cent) are male; and 69 per 
and active internal organisation. Over two decades, it has also 
built up a class of elected representatives at all institutional 
levels who have gathered a wealth of experience. In January 
2012 the party had 374 mayors, 12 provincial presidents and 
approximately 6,000 elected representatives, if all subnational 
branches of government are included.2 Moreover, its new 
leader Maroni was consistently the most popular minister in 
the Berlusconi-led government from 2008 to 2011.
The Lega Nord places strong emphasis on introducing 
federalism and tough limits on immigration. Since its 
foundation, the party has always pushed for greater northern 
autonomy. In recent years, Islam has become an increasingly 
significant theme for the Lega. Muslims and Islam are often 
characterised by the party as representing a fundamental threat 
to the values, way of life and cultural integrity of northerners. 
According to the Lega Nord’s narrative, the courts (run by 
elites) are complicit in undermining the values and traditions of 
the people, since minority rights are privileged over those of 
the indigenous majority. Likewise, the party holds that the 
EU — as an elite-driven organisation promoting 
globalisation — fails to do enough to prevent the arrival of 
immigrants and does not defend the common Christian roots 
of European people.3
The party is known for its Euroscepticism, but in reality 
it has often had an ambiguous relationship with the EU and 
integration. For example, until the late 1990s, the party was 
pro-European given the possibilities for greater regional 
expression offered at the supranational level. Since then, 
however, it has been characterised by its strong opposition to 
both the current construction of the EU and the trajectory of 
European integration.
The financial crisis hit Italy particularly strongly in the 
summer of 2011 and led to the resignation of the government in 
November 2011. It was replaced by a non-party technocratic 
government led by Mario Monti. This provoked a rupture 
between Berlusconi’s party, which has provided reluctant 
support to the new government, and the Lega, which is 
Monti’s most vociferous opponent in parliament. As a result of 
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 · Lega Nord Facebook supporters are far less Eurosceptic than those of 
other populist parties. When asked what they thought about the 
EU, 51 per cent of Lega Nord Facebook supporters gave the 
positive response: ‘freedom to work, study and travel’. Trust 
in the EU, at 43 per cent, was almost 30 points higher than the 
PPAM average of 14 per cent. 
 · Lega Nord Facebook supporters are no more pessimistic than 
the average Italian voter. On measures relating to personal 
optimism about their own lives, and views about the future of 
Italy, Lega Nord’s Facebook supporters had similar scores to 
the Italian general public. Equally, they score similar results 
for trust in other people, which is often used as a proxy for 
social capital. 
 · Lega Nord Facebook supporters distrust the media and justice system. 
Unlike respondents from other PPAMs in Europe, Lega Nord 
Facebook supporters do not display particularly low levels of 
trust towards most political and social institutions compared 
with their national compatriots. However, it is of note that the 
justice and legal system and the press were two institutions 
that scored especially badly among Lega Nord supporters. 
Implications
Our task in this report is to illuminate the phenomenon of 
online supporters of the Lega Nord and present the results 
objectively. We do not offer lengthy recommendations because 
formulating a response is a task for Italian citizens and 
politicians. This is perhaps a more difficult task given the fluid 
and dynamic way many people now express their political 
preferences online, and the way social media allow for groups 
and individuals to network and mobilise faster than ever. We 
hope this research can inform that task.
cent are under the age of 30 (which is far younger than the 
average age of Italian Facebook users, of whom only 35 per 
cent are under 25). This is at odds with what is known about 
traditional Lega Nord voters and party members, who are 
from a more mixed demographic. 
 · Facebook supporters of Lega Nord tend to be employed or students. 
Lega Nord Facebook supporters were more likely to be 
unemployed than the average Italian citizen (14 per cent vs 
8.2 per cent nationally at the time the survey was conducted), 
but given the large number of young people who completed 
this survey — and the 27.8 per cent rate of unemployment in 
Italy among those under 25 in July 2011– our respondents 
are actually more likely to be employed than the average 
Italian citizen their age. More than half (59 per cent) of 
supporters under 30 classified themselves as students, which 
is likely to reflect the long-standing trend of Italians spending 
significantly longer in university than northern Europeans.
 · Lega Nord Facebook supporters are motivated and active. Nearly 
one-third (30 per cent) are formal members of the party, 
while 43 per cent reported having taken part in a street 
demonstration or protest in the past six months, a percentage 
that is considerably higher than the average PPAM supporter 
(26 per cent).
 · Lega Nord Facebook supporters’ top concerns are more varied than 
other populist parties surveyed for this project. When asked to 
rank their top two social and political concerns, Lega Nord 
Facebook supporters said the economy and immigration. 
This may reflect both the impact of the crisis in Italy and the 
relative youth of our respondents. Interestingly, given the 
party’s focus on immigration and the presence of Muslims in 
Italy, Lega Nord Facebook suppoters were less likely than the 
average PPAM supporter to be concerned about immigration 
(25 per cent vs 37 per cent) and Islamic extremism (16 per cent 
vs 24 per cent).
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1  Background
 
 
The Lega Nord
The Lega Nord (Northern League) was formally created in 
1991 by the union of six regionalist ‘leagues’ which had 
emerged in the mid-1980s across the north of Italy. From the 
beginning, the party was led by Umberto Bossi — founder of 
the most electorally successful of these leagues, the Lega 
Lombarda (Lombard League). While many believed that the 
Lega Nord was a protest party which would not last, over 20 
years later it is now the oldest group in the Italian parliament. 
Having contributed to the demise of the First Republic party 
system by its criticisms of the traditional parties (and taking 
support from them), the Lega became a member of the first 
Second Republic government, led by Silvio Berlusconi, in 
1994. The party went on to serve in coalition governments 
(again led by Berlusconi) for eight of the ten years between 
2001 and 2011. In its electoral results and government 
positions held, the Lega has thus been one of Europe’s most 
successful regionalist parties. Moreover, unlike other populist 
parties such as the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands or the 
Freedom Party in Austria, the Lega Nord has proved able in 
the last decade to serve in government without losing votes, 
suffering internal splits or having to tone down its rhetoric.4
The Lega Nord entered government for the first time in 
1994, with just over 8 per cent of the vote, alongside prime 
minister Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia and the post-Fascist 
Alleanza Nazionale, led by Gianfranco Fini. However, there 
were evident tensions from the beginning, particularly on 
policy between Forza Italia and the Lega Nord — with both 
parties also strongly in competition for votes in the 
North — and on a personal level between the two leaders 
Bossi and Berlusconi. As the Lega Nord became increasingly 
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to 4.6 per cent — the Lega Nord remained Forza Italia’s most 
faithful ally for the next two years in opposition. After the 
fall of Romano Prodi’s centre-left government, the 2008 
general election would prove to be extremely successful for 
the Lega Nord, with the party receiving 8.3 per cent of the 
vote. This result not only almost doubled its 2006 
performance, but was the harbinger of a new period of 
success at the ballot box for the party. 
After its first year back in a coalition government 
consisting now of just itself and Berlusconi’s new party — the 
Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom), created by Forza 
Italia’s merger with Alleanza Nazionale — the Lega achieved its 
highest ever share of the national vote, 10.2 per cent, in the 
2009 European Parliament elections. The regional elections 
the following year were ever better for the party, with the Lega 
Nord gaining 26.2 per cent in Lombardy and 35.2 per cent 
(plus the regional presidency) in the Veneto. In many of the 
most productive areas of the country the Lega was now the top 
party. It also was making significant advances on its two key 
goals of federal reform (directed by the party leader Bossi in 
his position as Minister for Reform) and immigration (with the 
Lega Nord’s Roberto Maroni as Minister of the Interior 
leading the way on new restrictive measures).
The Lega Nord’s fortunes changed in 2011, however. 
First it had poor results in the local elections and then the 
Berlusconi government fell in November, under the pressure 
of the financial crisis and the Popolo della Libertà’s 
dwindling numbers in parliament. The subsequent decision 
by Berlusconi to support the government led by Mario Monti 
also provoked the end of the Lega–Popolo della Libertà 
alliance, and the Lega Nord became the main parliamentary 
opposition to the new technocratic administration. Worse 
was to come for the Lega in 2012 with the revelation of party 
misuse of public funds, in particular by figures close to 
Umberto Bossi (including two of his sons). This led to calls 
for the leader to step down and opened tensions between 
those supporting Bossi and those favouring the other leading 
figure in the party, Maroni. Eventually, Bossi resigned in 
estranged from its coalition partners, it was no surprise when 
the party brought down the government in December 1994. 
The next six years were ones of isolation for the Lega Nord, 
because of its refusal of alliances and its move from a 
northern regionalist position to one of advocating 
independence for Padania (a macro-region, compromising 
most of northern Italy). During this period, the party ran 
alone nationally and locally, rejecting all other parties as 
being part of the same corrupt elites. While this strategy 
seemed to pay off at the 1996 general election, when it 
received 10.1 per cent of the vote, ultimately the Lega Nord 
was penalised by the bipolar logic of Italy’s electoral 
systems. In other words, as long as the party remained 
outside a coalition, it was destined also to remain outside 
power, whether nationally or regionally. However, that same 
logic (of creating two very broad coalitions) also meant 
that — even though its vote was declining rapidly in the late 
1990s — the Lega continued to be a potentially decisive ally. 
In 2000, this resulted in a rapprochement between Bossi and 
Berlusconi in time for the 2001 general election.5
Although that election was the Lega Nord’s worst to date 
in vote share (3.9 per cent), the centre-right coalition of which 
it was now again part easily won. While numerically — in votes 
received and MPs elected — the Lega was in a far weaker 
position than it had been in 1994, this time Bossi clearly 
enjoyed an excellent relationship with Berlusconi. The Lega 
Nord emphasised its loyalty to the prime minister, receiving in 
return his support for the Lega Nord’s key policy efforts on 
federalism and immigration. The party also, however, seemed 
proud to be in near-constant conflict with its fellow junior 
coalition partners of the Alleanza Nazionale and the former 
Christian Democrats of the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani 
e di Centro. This division of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ allowed 
the Lega Nord to paint a picture to its members and 
supporters of government participation providing influence 
on policy, but without the party having sold out.
Following the coalition’s narrow defeat in the 2006 
general election — but with the Lega Nord increasing its share 
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than those of other right-wing and even centrist parties in 
Italy — which are not consistent with radical right voters.9 
For our purposes in this report, therefore, we believe it is 
more useful to treat the party as a clear-cut case of what the 
academics Roberto Biorcio and Duncan McDonnell have 
termed ‘regionalist populism’.10 
It is impossible to understand the party without 
emphasising the party’s regionalist character. Since its 
foundation, and its roots in the leagues of the 1980s, the key 
issue for the Lega Nord has always been that of procuring 
greater autonomy for the north of Italy. While the degree of 
autonomy demanded may have oscillated over time, from 
federalism to independence to devolution and, in recent 
years, to fiscal federalism, this central tenet of the party’s 
ideology has never been displaced. As one of the party’s 
earliest chroniclers, Ilvo Diamanti, wrote: Bossi ‘redefined 
the concept of territory’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s.11 
The Lega Nord reshaped the economic, political, historical 
and cultural reference points of the North into a community 
of ‘interests’ and ‘values’ and set them against those of the 
Italian state and southern Italy. Typical of populist discourse, 
it constructed a framework of interpretation in which a 
virtuous and homogeneous ‘us’ — honest, hard-working and 
simple-living northern Italians attached to their local 
traditions — was cast as under siege from above by the 
financial, political and cultural elites and, from below, by a 
series of others, in particular southerners and immigrants. 
In this sense, the Lega Nord provided what the UK analyst 
Damian Tambini terms ‘a new source of self-respect’ for 
northerners.12 The party told northerners that they were not 
to blame for the problems of Italy, but instead were in fact the 
principal victims of the Italian state, whose corruption and 
waste northerners were being forced to pay for. The solution 
to this injustice, the party has always said, is to introduce 
measures by which northerners will gain greater control over 
how their localities are run and their money spent. Hence, as 
far as possible, the Lega Nord says that taxes from northern 
regions should remain in the North, rather than being 
April 2012 (becoming ‘Life President’ of the Lega) and 
Maroni was elected as new Federal Secretary at the party 
congress in July 2012. 
These difficulties have been reflected in poor opinion poll 
results during 2012, in which the Lega Nord slipped back to its 
2006 level of around 5 per cent. Nonetheless, it seems likely 
that the Lega Nord will remain a force in Italian politics and 
will survive the passage of leadership from Bossi to Maroni. It 
is clearly no longer in danger of being a ‘flash-in-the-pan’ 
protest movement, nor — like Berlusconi’s parties — is it one 
whose lifespan depends on its founder. As outlined below, it is 
a party with a clear ideology and unique policy offer, backed 
by a well-structured and active internal organisation. Over two 
decades, it has also built up a class of elected representatives at 
all institutional levels who have gathered a wealth of 
experience. Currently, the Lega Nord has 172 elected 
representatives spread out between European, national and 
regional levels. Of these, 80 are MPs, 83 are regional 
councillors and nine are MEPs. The party also had, as of 
January 2012, 374 mayors, 12 provincial presidents and 
approximately 6000 elected representatives, if all subnational 
branches of government are included.6
Is the Lega Nord a populist party? 
There is broad agreement among Italian and international 
academic scholars of populism that the Lega Nord is a clear 
case of a populist party.7 Where disputes tend to occur in the 
classification of the Lega Nord is on the issue of whether it 
should also be defined as ‘radical right’. For example, the 
Dutch scholar Cas Mudde notes that while ‘populism has 
always been a core feature of the Lega Nord’, the party’s 
qualification as ‘radical right’ is more complicated.8 It is worth 
noting that — unlike clear cases of radical right parties such as 
the Austrian Freedom Party, the Norwegian Progress Party or 
the Swiss People’s Party — the Lega Nord itself has always 
rejected the ‘right-wing’ label. In surveys, its supporters have 
also displayed attitudes — such as less aversion to communism 
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Europe per se’, but against the creation of ‘a genuine 
continental super-state in which democracy is, in practice, 
non-existent’.15 It is worth noting, however, that until the late 
1990s, the Lega was pro-European, given the possibilities for 
greater regional expression offered by the EU. This was 
intertwined with the claim by the party that the North was the 
only ‘European’ area of the country. The party’s position 
changed radically following Italian acceptance into European 
Monetary Union in 1998. Had Italy been forced to remain 
outside, the Lega Nord was ready to make the case that the 
North (and northern business in particular) was paying too 
high a price for the deficiencies of the rest of the country and 
should secede. Performing a U-turn from Europhile to 
Eurosceptic, the Lega Nord since the end of the 1990s has 
been the harshest critic among Italian parties of the EU and 
European integration. That said, despite the rhetoric, it seems 
that Europe is an issue on which the party is in reality always 
willing to compromise. For example, under pressure from its 
allies, the Lega Nord voted in parliament for both the Nice 
and Lisbon treaties in 2002 and 2008 respectively. It could be 
argued, therefore, that Europe is an issue which the party is 
happy to use when the conditions are propitious, and to set to 
one side when they are not.
Organisational structure and leadership 
Analysts have often pointed to the strongly hierarchical and 
centralised structure of the Lega Nord as granting the leader 
‘an exceptional level of internal control’.16 However, even 
though the Lega Nord has been dominated by its leader, 
Bossi’s control of the party was not something so much 
reflected in specific rules, as in practices and 
communications.17 For example, despite the party statute 
stipulating that a federal congress must be held every three 
years (and the leader re-elected during it), Bossi did not call 
one for the ten years between 2002 and 2012. Likewise, it 
seems clear — despite the party’s internal federal 
structure — that the leader retained full control over 
dissipated in the centre and South by inefficient government 
agencies and corrupt politicians.
The Lega Nord’s offer to northerners can be summed up 
in the party’s key slogan of making the people once more 
‘masters in their homes’. This relates to all elements in the Lega 
Nord’s policy platform, but is particularly strongly linked to its 
two dominant issues of federalism and immigration. The first 
chapter of the party’s 2009 policy document Proposte e Obiettivi 
(Proposals and Objectives) is dedicated to federalism; and the 
second chapter to immigration and security. All subsequent 
chapters — whether on Europe, the family, agriculture, the 
economy or infrastructure — are to greater and lesser extents 
related back to the need to introduce federalism and combat 
immigration.13 Although the party officially says it only opposes 
illegal immigration, it seems apparent that it is not comfortable 
with the presence of non-Western European outsiders in 
northern communities. This is particularly so in the case of 
Muslims, which has become an increasingly significant theme 
for the party over the past decade. One of the main ways it did 
this was by presenting itself as the most vociferous and toughest 
opponent of Islam and those from Muslim-majority countries 
present in — or intending to come to — Italy. Muslims and Islam 
are often characterised by the party as representing a 
fundamental threat to the values, way of life and cultural 
integrity of northerners. We can see this, for example, in Lega 
Nord claims that Muslim communities wish to impose changes 
in schools such as the removal of crucifixes and Christmas 
cribs, and the banning of pork products in canteens. These are 
linked to warnings that Quranic laws are supplanting local 
ones in many countries and that Western (inevitably Christian) 
identity, traditions and norms are in danger.
According to the Lega Nord’s narrative, the courts (run 
by elites) are complicit in these attacks on the people, where 
minority rights are privileged over those of the indigenous 
majority, and the EU fails to do enough to prevent the arrival 
of immigrants and does not defend the common Christian 
roots of the people.14 Although the party has been described 
as Eurosceptic, it counters by saying that it is not ‘against 
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voted for the PVV in the Netherlands, the Danish People’s 
Party, the Front National in France, and Vlaams Belang in 
Belgium — usually by at least two percentage points.19 
There were no major generational imbalances among the 
party voters according to the ITANES 2008 data. Although 
10.8 per cent of 55–64-year-olds voted for the party, 10.5 per 
cent of those between 35 and 44 did so, as did 8.5 per cent of 
18–24-year-olds. As regards education levels, the most likely 
people to vote for the party were those who left full-time 
education after receiving their middle-school (9.4 per cent) 
or high-school (8.9 per cent) diploma. Consistent with the 
figures for other PPAMs, only 3.6 per cent of university 
graduates voted for the party. There was a significant 
preponderance of private-sector workers of various types 
(from managers to blue-collar) as opposed to those in the 
public sector. Strikingly, just 1.8 per cent of teachers voted 
for the Lega Nord in 2008. As was to be expected — given the 
long-standing strength of the party in provincial areas of the 
North — 10.8 per cent of citizens in towns with a population 
of less than 5,000 inhabitants, but only 3.1 per cent of those 
living in cities with populations exceeding 250,000 voted for 
the party. Finally, those who are concerned about immigration 
are twice as likely to vote for the Lega, while citizens worried 
about crime (often linked to immigration) are circa 1.5 times 
as likely to vote for the party.
Research shows a strong correspondence between the 
party’s key themes — northern autonomy and the fight against 
immigration — and reasons cited for backing the party. Daniele 
Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell conducted a survey of over 
200 party members and sympathisers at the important annual 
party rally in Pontida, held on 14 June 2009.20 When asked for 
the three main reasons why they supported the party, 73.4 per 
cent of respondents listed federalism and 71.7 per cent 
immigration. No other issue came within 40 percentage points 
of these two. Interestingly, given what we have said above, 
Europe only accounted for 2.7 per cent.
candidatures at all levels, with local and regional branches 
having little real say in the matter.
Although the party lacks internal democracy, in other 
ways it resembles a traditional mass party far more than its 
competitors. Unlike mainstream parties in which the difference 
between supporters and members has been blurred by the 
introduction of open primaries, online enrolment and the 
drastic reduction of local branches, in the Lega Nord the 
situation is very different. The number of party branches has 
steadily increased, while membership of the Lega Nord is 
something which must be earned and is prized. Members are 
divided into two hierarchical categories: the ‘soci ordinari-
militanti’ (‘ordinary members-activists’) and ‘soci sostenitori’ 
(‘supporting members’). The latter can only progress to the 
‘ordinary member-activist’ level after having proved their 
activism over a period of at least six months. This entails 
regular attendance of weekly meetings, participation in staffing 
information stalls at markets or in piazzas, putting up posters 
on walls and similar activities. Despite these requirements (or 
perhaps also because of them, given that they provide members 
with a sense of mission and genuine involvement), the number 
of Lega Nord members has increased over the past decade. At 
least according to figures made available by its central office in 
Milan, at the end of 2011 the party had 173,044 members. While 
down on the 2010 total of 182,502 — its highest ever number of 
members — the 2011 figure represents an almost 40 per cent 
increase on 2001 when the party had 124,310 members.
Lega Nord and voters 
According to the ITANES study of the 2008 general election, 
the Lega Nord’s electorate presented a number of similarities, 
but also important differences, compared to other PPAMs. For 
example, unlike most PPAMS — which gain considerably more 
support from men than women — according to the ITANES 
election survey, the Lega was voted for by 8.5 per cent of 
women and 8.2 per cent of men in 2008.18 By contrast, the 
European Social Survey showed that more men than women 
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Lega Nord and social media 
Traditionally, Italian parties have made very poor use of 
internet and social media, and the Lega Nord has been no 
exception. Party representative Facebook pages and websites 
often only sprung into life during election campaigns and 
would then lie dormant. Moreover, the Lega Nord’s website 
itself (www.leganord.org) was for many years difficult to 
navigate and outdated in design and content. This situation 
appears to be changing quickly under the new leader, Roberto 
Maroni, however. Since he took over in July 2012, the party 
website has been redesigned and improved. Moreover, a large 
number of Lega Nord representatives and party employees 
acquired Twitter accounts in a very short space of time during 
the late summer of 2012. Judging by some of the early 
comments, many of them were clearly strongly encouraged by 
the party to do so. Maroni has led the way, being extremely 
active both on Facebook (www.facebook.com/maroni.
leganord) and Twitter (@maroni_leganord). Whether the 
Lega has learned to use internet and social media better will 
be tested during the 2013 general election campaign.
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2  Who are the Lega Nord 
Facebook supporters?
This chapter presents the socio-economic, age and gender data 
of Lega Nord Facebook supporters who took part in our survey. 
Where possible, we present this information in the context of 
broader Italian society and make comparisons to similar groups 
in Western Europe, as presented in the Demos report The New 
Face of Digital Populism.21
Demographics and geography
Using Facebook’s publicly available advertising tool, it is 
possible to identify the age and gender of all Italian users of 
Facebook, as well as the basic demographic information of 
Facebook members who express a preference for the Lega Nord.
Across the country as a whole, Italian Facebook users are 
slightly more likely to be male than female (54 per cent vs 46 
per cent, n=20,731,520), but among the Lega Nord’s Facebook 
supporters, 78 per cent are male and 22 per cent are female 
(n=45,740). This obviously does not reflect the gender profile 
of the party’s voters in 2008, as we discussed in the previous 
chapter, but it may better represent the gender split among the 
party’s members. For example, much like the profile of our 
Facebook respondents here, those in Albertazzi and 
McDonnell’s 2009 survey at the annual Pontida rally were 
divided 71.6 per cent male and just 28.4 per cent female.22
Lega Nord supporters were among the youngest of all 
those party sympathisers surveyed in the Digital Populism 
project: 69 per cent were under 25, compared with the PPAM 
average of 51 per cent. They were also far younger than the 
average Facebook users in Italy, of whom only 35 per cent are 
under 25. Only 8 per cent of respondents in our survey were 
over the age of 40.
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Table 2   Highest educational attainment of Lega Nord Facebook 
supporters, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=838)
Male  
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
High-school diploma 58 60 62 50 59
University degree 19 22 19 24 20
Technical qualification 12 9 8 20 11
Did not answer 11 9 11 6 10
Lega Nord Facebook supporters were more likely to be 
unemployed than the average Italian citizen (14 per cent vs 7.9 
per cent nationally at the time the survey was conducted), but 
about the same as other supporters of PPAMs (14 per cent) 
(table 3). However, given the large number of young people 
who completed this survey — and the 27.8 per cent 
unemployment rate in Italy among those under 25 in July 
2011– our respondents are actually more likely to be employed 
than the average Italian citizen their age. This in turn reflects 
the fact that our respondents were almost all based in the more 
prosperous north of Italy. Nearly three in five (59 per cent) of 
supporters under 30 classified themselves as students. 
Although this figure seems high at first glance, it is almost 
certainly due to the established trend of Italians spending 
significantly longer in university than northern Europeans. 
Moreover, given the current crisis, it seems probable that many 
young people are choosing to remain in university. 
Table 3    Employment status of Lega Nord Facebook supporters (n=838),  
by gender and whether under or over age 30 
(national statistics in brackets) 23
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Employed 40 35 26 78 38 (61.2)
Unemployed 12 17 14 14 14 (7.9)
Student 46 47 59 2 46
Did not answer 2 1 1 6 2
The age demographic of our sample, therefore, does not 
accurately represent the typical Lega Nord voter — which is far 
more varied. This is partly driven by the young age 
demographic of Facebook users in Italy, although, as table 1 
sets out, this does not account entirely for the difference. The 
precise reasons for this are not clear. However, like many other 
European countries, Facebook was initially popular among 
university students, which might explain some of the difference 
(although Facebook is now relatively representative of the 
Italian public, with over 20 million users). Nevertheless, the 
sample does offer a unique insight into one important sub-
group of the party’s supporters: young social media users.
Table 1   Age group of Lega Nord Facebook supporters (n=45,740) 
(Italy total in brackets) and supporters of Western Europe PPAMs 
(Europe total in brackets)
Age group Lega Nord total (Italy 
total) (%)
Western Europe PPAMs 
(Europe total) (%)
16–20 45 (18) 32 (19)
21–25 24 (17) 19 (17)
26–30 10 (14) 12 (14)
31–40 12 (25) 17 (21)
41–50 5 (16) 12 (15)
51+ 3 (10) 8 (13)
 
Education and employment
The proportion of respondents whose highest education 
qualification is a high-school diploma (59 per cent) is slightly 
above the pan-European PPAM figure of 45 per cent. The 
proportion of respondents who have a ‘high-school diploma’ 
falls among older Lega Nord supporters (from 62 per cent 
among under 30s to 50 per cent among those over 30); 
therefore the relatively high overall figure may at least in part 
be due to the youth of Lega Nord respondents (table 2). 
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Membership and involvement
To determine the extent to which Lega Nord Facebook 
supporters are involved in offline activity, we asked respondents 
whether they had voted for the Lega Nord at the last general 
election in 2008 and if they had participated in any 
demonstrations or street protests in the past six months (table 4).
Of the Facebook supporters we surveyed, only 43 per 
cent reported having voted for the party at the last election, a 
significantly lower proportion than the PPAM average of 67 
per cent, but this is probably because many were not eligible to 
vote at the 2008 election. In fact, the proportion of those over 
30 who voted for Lega Nord rises to 59 per cent. These figures 
are similar to those for many of the groups studied as part of 
this series. For example, of the 48 per cent of respondents who 
voted for the Danish People’s Party in the last general election, 
32 per cent were under 30 years of age and 78 per cent of voters 
were over 30. In Sweden, 57 per cent of under 30s in our 
sample voted for the Swedish Democrats at the last election, 
compared with 89 per cent of those over 30 did.24
In other respects, the respondents appear highly 
motivated: 30 per cent are formal members of the party 
compared with the average of 32 per cent of PPAMs who are 
formal members of the party or group,25 while 43 per cent 
reported having taken part in a street demonstration or protest 
in the past six months, a considerably higher percentage than 
the average PPAM supporter (26 per cent). 
Table 4    Offline involvement of Lega Nord Facebook supporters (n=838), 
by gender and whether under or over age 30 
(national statistics in brackets)
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Formal members of LN (%) 31 28 29 34 30 (n/a)
Voted for LN in the 2008 
gen. election (%)
42 46 39 59 43 (8.30)  26
Taken part in march 
or demo in last  
6/12 months (%)
42 45 46 33 43 (37.8)  27
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3  Social and political 
concerns
 
 
We asked Lega Nord Facebook supporters a number of 
questions about their social and political views, trust in people 
and political institutions, and opinions about the future for 
themselves and their country. Where possible, we compare 
results to a Eurobarometer survey and the European Values 
Study in order to make many meaningful comparisons with 
national level data. We also draw comparisons with supporters 
of other PPAMs throughout.
Top two biggest concerns
When asked to rank their top two social and political concerns 
from a list of 18 current issues, the most common responses 
from Lega Nord Facebook supporters were the economy and 
immigration (table 5). In this respect, they do not mirror the 
top concerns of the supporters of similar parties across Western 
Europe. Lega Nord supporters were less likely than the average 
PPAM supporter to be concerned about immigration (25 per 
cent vs 37 per cent) and Islamic extremism (16 per cent vs 24 per 
cent); but more likely than the average PPAM supporter to be 
concerned about the economic situation (25 per cent vs 16 per 
cent), unemployment (23 per cent vs 13 per cent) and education 
(15 per cent vs 7 per cent). This level of concern about the 
economic situation seems likely to be a result of the timing of 
the survey, which took place in July and August 2011 — in 
summer 2011 Italy became the focus of the financial crisis. Its 
borrowing costs began escalating rapidly and fears about the 
country becoming ‘another Greece’ were high.
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Table 6   Extent to which Lega Nord Facebook supporters agree that it 
does not matter who you vote for, by gender and whether under 
or over age 30 (n=838)
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
Agree entirely 5 6 4 7 5
Agree a little 5 2 4 4 4
Indifferent 12 5 10 13 10
Disagree a little 11 18 15 7 13
Disagree entirely 66 68 66 68 67
Did not answer 1 1 1 1 1
 
Although they appear to believe in the importance of voting, 
Lega Nord Facebook supporters remain somewhat sceptical 
about the extent to which politics is an effective means to 
resolve their problems: only 45 per cent of supporters agreed 
with the statement ‘politics is an effective way to respond to my 
concerns’ (table 7). While this is more than the 35 per cent 
average for the other PPAM supporters whom we surveyed, this 
result is nonetheless surprising given the electoral performances 
of the Lega Nord and, in particular, the party’s policy successes 
on its key issues of federalism and immigration when in 
government after 2008. There are at least two possible 
explanations here: first, at the time of this survey (July and 
August 2011), the Lega Nord–Popolo della Libertà government 
was in great difficulty, the Lega had suffered its first election 
setback in many years (at the May 2011 local elections), and it 
was appearing increasingly likely that the growing crisis would 
significantly delay the introduction of fiscal federalism or 
postpone it indefinitely. These considerations are likely to have 
influenced responses. Second, given that the Lega Nord has 
often espoused an ‘anti-political’ rhetoric, it is also possible that 
some respondents negatively associate the term ‘politics’ not 
with their own party, but with other parties and politicians. In 
other words, ‘politics’ for some Lega Nord supporters may well 
stand for the murky world of backroom deals in Rome.
Table 5    Top two biggest concerns of Lega Nord Facebook supporters 
(n=838), by gender and whether under or over age 30 28 
(national figures in brackets) 29
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Economic situation 26 24 24 30 25 (61)
Immigration 26 24 26 22 25 (6)
Unemployment 22 24 23 23 23 (47)
Islamic extremism 15 16 17 10 16 (2) 
Education 12 19 17 6 15 (2) 30
 
Politics and voting
We also asked Lega Nord Facebook supporters to tell us their 
views about the effectiveness of democracy in order to gauge 
the level of disillusionment they felt with mainstream political 
channels. In general, Facebook supporters of Lega Nord were 
pessimistic about the effectiveness of politics, although only 9 
per cent agreed with the statement ‘it does not matter who 
you vote for’ (table 6), which compares with a PPAM average 
of 16 per cent. Thus, Lega Nord Facebook supporters are not 
too disproportionately bitter and disenchanted to vote 
compared with similar supporters in other countries. On one 
level it is to be expected that supporters of political parties 
agree with voting. However, given these are social media fans, 
it is worth noting that even those who engage through 
Facebook (and therefore do not necessarily vote) still retain 
faith in the power of voting.
41Social and political concerns
Table 8   Extent to which Lega Nord Facebook supporters agree that 
violence is acceptable to achieve the right outcome, by gender 
and whether under or over age 30 (n=838)
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total (%)
Agree entirely 18 8 15 12 15
Agree a little 17 19 19 12 18
Indifferent – – – – 5
Disagree a little 12 9 12 7 11
Disagree entirely 41 61 45 58 48
Note: An average of 5 per cent answered they were indifferent, and 3 per 
cent did not answer. 
Personal and national optimism
Almost certainly reflecting what was happening in Italy when 
the survey took place, the majority of Lega Nord Facebook 
supporters were highly pessimistic about their country’s future: 
81 per cent disagreed either a little or entirely with the 
statement ‘Italy is on the right track’ (table 9). The general 
public in Italy displayed similar levels of optimism and 
pessimism at the time. The Eurobarometer survey in autumn 
2011 asked, ‘at the present time, would you say that, in general, 
things are going in the right direction or in the wrong 
direction, in Italy?’. Only 8 per cent of the Italian public 
believed Italy was going in the right direction; over half the 
respondents (65 per cent) thought Italy was going in the wrong 
direction; and 21 per cent thought it was headed in neither one 
direction nor the other.31
Table 7   Extent to which Lega Nord Facebook supporters agree that 
politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns, by 
gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=838)
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Agree entirely 17 15 15 21 16
Agree a little 30 26 29 28 29
Indifferent – – – – 13
Disagree a little 14 15 15 11 14
Disagree entirely 19 28 23 20 22
Did not answer – – – – 5 
Note: An average of 13 per cent of people answered this question as 
‘indifferent’, and around 5 per cent did not answer. 
 
We asked respondents a question designed to test their 
attitude to violence. It is important to stress that, in the 
absence of national level data, it is difficult to draw significant 
conclusions from these results. Moreover, the survey question 
does not ask about people’s personal propensity to violent 
activity, rather their attitude to violence in general. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that more Lega Nord 
supporters agreed that violence is acceptable to achieve the 
right outcome (33 per cent) (table 8) than the average of 26 
per cent of PPAM supporters. This may, at least in part, 
reflect the occasional warnings in the past of the party leader, 
Umberto Bossi, that if the democratic process could not 
ensure northern autonomy, other methods might have to be 
used. Indeed, through its establishment of the ‘green shirts’ 
in the late 1990s during its secessionist phase and its more 
recent use of small vigilante groups in some towns to protect 
citizens from crime (and immigrants), the Lega has at times 
had a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the use of force. 
While this is in no way to say that the party supports violence 
and these groups were generally more virtual than real, it is 
important to note that — at least rhetorically — the party has 
occasionally sent out mixed messages on this subject.
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Attitudes toward the European Union
Lega Nord Facebook supporters’ attitudes to the European 
Union differ considerably from those of other PPAMs and are 
particularly interesting given that the Lega has espoused a 
strongly Eurosceptic rhetoric over the past decade. Unlike 
supporters of other PPAMs, Lega Nord supporters gave a 
positive top answer when asked what they thought about the 
EU: 51 per cent responded ‘freedom to work, study and travel’. 
Beyond that, three of the top five answers were clearly negative 
(table 11), but respondents were slightly less likely to cite 
negative answers than supporters of other PPAMs: 33 per cent 
of Lega Nord supporters mentioned ‘not enough control at 
external borders’ (compared with 58 per cent for other PPAMs), 
while 32 per cent said the EU was a ‘waste of money’ (59 per 
cent for other PPAMs). Likewise — and of note if we recall the 
claims by the Lega that the EU threatens local, cultural and 
religious identities — only 29 per cent mentioned ‘loss of 
cultural and national identity’ (56 per cent for other PPAMs).
A significantly lower percentage of the general public in 
Italy than Facebook supporters of the Lega Nord thought that 
the EU meant freedom to work, travel and study anywhere in 
the EU — only 26 per cent listed this. The Lega Nord and the 
Italian public had similar views on the Euro, with 39 per cent 
of Italians listing it — only 2 per cent more than the Lega Nord. 
Three other options had a much lower response from members 
of the Italian public than from Lega Nord Facebook 
supporters. For instance, only 9 per cent of the Italian public 
cited ‘Not enough control at external borders’, compared with 
33 per cent of the Lega Nord supporters. Generally, the Italian 
public associated membership of the EU with freedom and the 
Euro, democracy (21 per cent) and having ‘a stronger say in the 
world’ (21 per cent).33
Table 9   Extent to which Lega Nord Facebook supporters agree that Italy is on 
the right track, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=838)
Male  
(%)
Female  
(%)
Under 30  
(%)
Over 30  
(%)
Total  
(%)
Agree entirely 4 2 3 4 3
Agree a little 9 5 7 11 8
Indifferent – – – – 4
Disagree a little 19 22 21 19 20
Disagree entirely 58 65 63 53 61
Note: An average of 4 per cent answered they were indifferent,  
and 4 per cent did not answer. 
When asked whether they thought their own life would be 
better or worse in 12 months’ time, Lega Nord Facebook 
supporters were less optimistic (21 per cent) than the PPAM 
average (27 per cent). Again this appears likely to reflect the 
conditions in Italy at the time of the survey, and Lega Nord 
Facebook supporters were not much more pessimistic than the 
Italian general public: 21 per cent of Lega Nord supporters 
believed that the situation in Italy would get better, compared 
with 19 per cent of the Italian public thinking it would (table 10). 
However, that this may also reflect the different timing of the 
two surveys: the Eurobarometer survey was conducted later than 
our questionnaire, by which time the crisis in Italy was at its 
height and the government was on the point of collapse.
Table 10   Lega Nord Facebook supporters’ personal outlook for the next 
12 months, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=838) 
(national statistics in brackets) 32
Male  
  %)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
Better 22 20 23 15 21 (19)
Worse 31 33 29 41 32 (18)
Same 42 45 44 40 43 (55)
Did not answer – – – – 4
Note: An average of 4 per cent did not answer. 
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over 80 per cent of the members they surveyed considered all 
newspapers to be against the party (except the Lega Nord’s 
own paper, La Padania).38
Table 12   Extent to which Lega Nord Facebook supporters and the Italian 
general public trust institutions (n=838) 
Institution Tend to trust Tend not to trust
LN supporters 
(%)
Italian public 
(%) 39
LN supporters 
(%)
Italian public 
(%)
Police 63 58 32 34
Army 61 65 33 28
European Union 43 42 52 40
Justice and the 
legal system
30 42 65 52
Religious 
institutions
29 48 65 43
Trade unions 28 32 66 56
Government 24 24 70 65
Political parties 23 9 71 84
The press40 18 34 75 53
Note: The figures do not always add up to 100 because some people did not 
complete all the questions. 
Asked whether they are inclined to trust other people in 
general, 31 per cent of Lega Nord Facebook supporters agreed 
(table 13). This is around the average figure for PPAM 
supporters (33 per cent) and for the Italian general public  
(31 per cent). Moreover, the Italian general public is less likely 
than Lega Nord Facebook supporters to think that people 
can be trusted.
Table 11   What Lega Nord Facebook supporters think about the European 
Union, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=838) 
(national statistics in brackets) 34
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Freedom to work, 
study and travel 35
46 60 54 41 51 (26)
The Euro 36 40 38 36 37 (39)
Not enough control 
at external borders
33 32 31 38 33 (9)
Waste of money 32 31 30 37 32 (16)
Loss of cultural and 
national identity 36
30 28 27 38 29 (12)
Trust in institutions and people
Trust in other people, as well as political and social institutions, 
is generally considered to be an important indicator of social 
capital in democratic societies. Unlike respondents from other 
PPAMs in Europe, Lega Nord Facebook supporters do not 
display particularly low levels of trust towards most political 
and social institutions compared with their national 
compatriots (table 12). Across the other parties and movements 
surveyed for this series, supporters of PPAMs typically scored 
around 20–30 percentage points lower than their compatriots 
on every measure tested.37 This may reflect the fact that the 
Lega has been in government at national and regional levels for 
many years and so it is likely that a certain degree of trust in 
institutions has been built up over time. Indeed, from that 
perspective, since the Lega Nord was in office at the time of the 
survey, we might have expected the level of trust in government 
among respondents to be higher than the national average. 
Finally, it is of note that the justice and legal system and the 
press were two institutions that scored particularly badly 
among Lega Nord supporters. This is to be expected given the 
Lega’s criticisms of the judiciary and its long-standing claims 
that the mainstream media is against it. It is also in line with 
the Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell’s finding that 
47Social and political concerns
Table 13   Extent to which Lega Nord Facebook supporters agree that 
people can be trusted, by gender and whether under or over age 
30 (n=838) (national statistics in brackets) 41
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
In general most people 
can be trusted
28 37 31 31 31  
(30.9)
In general most people 
cannot be trusted
50 49 50 50 50  
(69.1)
Note: In the Demos question, ‘indifferent’ was also an option, which account 
for around 15 per cent of responses. Around 4 per cent of respondents did 
not answer this question. 
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4  Why do people support 
the Lega Nord online?
The preceding chapter offered some indication of why Lega 
Nord Facebook supporters are drawn to the party, but we also 
wanted respondents to describe in their own words why they 
support the Lega Nord. This chapter presents our findings on 
387 respondents’ answers to an open-response question asking 
them to explain this.
Table 14 provides a breakdown of the different categories 
that we used to code and classify the responses (which we placed 
in multiple categories if deemed relevant). The three most 
common replies were identified with the party’s values and key 
themes of immigration and northern autonomy. We discuss the 
most frequently cited categories below, and provide examples of 
some of the responses Lega Nord Facebook supporters gave.
Table 14  Reasons given by Lega Nord Facebook respondents for 
supporting the party, by gender and age bracket (n=387)
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
16–20 
(%)
21–25  
%)
26–30 
(%)
31–40 
(%)
41–50 
(%)
51+ 
(%)
Total
Group values 35 54 46 48 23 32 43 41 42
Anti 
-immigration
20 13 19 24 11 16 8 1 18
Northern 
autonomy 
19 12 11 19 25 28 14 23 17
Other 13 14 14 10 19 14 15 11 14
Identity 12 4 9 8 8 8 10 22 9
Economic 4 8 3 9 22 1 2 0 6
Disillusionment 6 1 2 5 4 6 9 8 4
Integrity 3 4 3 3 0 4 6 3 3
Anti-Islam 2 0 1 2 4 1 1 0 1
Anti-EU 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
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It is the only party strongly linked to the grassroots and its voters.43
Because of the principles for which the movement was created: 
protecting our areas, culture and traditions.
I like Bossi’s charisma and I agree with the party’s ideology.44
I agree with the ideas of the Lega such as federalism and the fight 
against illegal immigration! 45
Anti-immigration
Recent studies have shown than concern over immigration is 
a key predictor for support of PPAMs. Respondents were 
classified as being in the anti-immigration category when they 
explicitly professed concern or anger about rising immigration 
and its effects. Nearly one in five (18 per cent) of Lega Nord 
Facebook supporters fell into this category — in line with the 
average across similar parties surveyed. 
The Lega Nord Facebook supporters who commented on 
this subject typically referred to the economic and cultural 
effects of immigration on Italy, although some also seemed to 
object to the mere presence of immigrants:
Because I am tired of seeing my country being destroyed by people 
that weren’t born here and of seeing those close to me being afraid of 
those we have welcomed.46
Because it’s time to liberate Italy from all the immigrants who steal 
our jobs every single day. And it’s not true that Italians don’t want 
to do certain jobs anymore. I know many people who would pay to 
have a job, even collecting horse shit.47
I do not want immigrants in MY country. There are too many  
of them.48
I don’t want any more non-European immigrants who come here 
and take our jobs! 49
Overall, Lega Nord supporters were more likely to give 
some reasons for supporting the party than the average 
PPAM supporter, for example ‘group values’ (42 per cent vs 
39 per cent) and ‘economic’ (6 per cent vs 4 per cent). In the 
latter case, supporters were overwhelming in the 26–30 age 
bracket, who are most affected by unemployment and non-
permanent employment, or if still students likely to be 
worried about their future prospects. Compared with other 
PPAM supporters, Lega Nord supporters were less likely to 
cite ‘identity’ (9 per cent vs 18 per cent), ‘anti-Islam’ (1 per 
cent vs 10 per cent), ‘anti-EU’ (0 per cent vs 3 per cent) and 
‘integrity’ (3 per cent vs 9 per cent), but as likely to cite 
‘immigration’. This is interesting as, unlike the party in its 
rhetoric, the supporters do not seem to make the same 
distinction between the greater dangers posed by Muslim 
immigration than by immigration in general.
Group values
Responses were classified as ‘group values’ when respondents 
had cited, in general terms, the values, principles, norms, 
beliefs, aspirations or ideas of the Lega Nord as reasons for 
supporting the party. This was the most common reason for 
joining the party, and 42 per cent of responses fell into this 
category, a slightly higher proportion than for supporters of 
other PPAMs (38 per cent). It suggests that people support the 
party not simply as a ‘protest’ against other mainstream 
parties, but because they identify with the Lega’s values. This 
probably reflects the fact that the party has been in existence 
for over two decades and so is no longer simply a vehicle for 
protest. Its ideology and key themes are well known and those 
supporting the party are likely to identify closely with them.
Respondents on this subject supported what the party 
stands for overall, appreciated its strong links to local 
communities and admired the leader: 
Because it’s close to my ideas and, most of all, it is the only party 
which seems to want to improve things in Italy.42
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these respondents mentioned how the Lega Nord stood for 
ordinary people, and the defence of their traditions and values:
Because, at the moment, it’s the only political party that represents 
the values of ordinary people without denying and rejecting cultural 
traditions and identities.54
Because it’s a political party that keeps local identities alive. 
It respects and promotes centuries-old traditions.55
I want to support a party that acts as a lobby for the North and 
defends the identity of my people. 56
Because it’s a political party that REALLY gives a voice to the 
ordinary citizen.57
Again, this matches the Lega’s claims to be the sole 
protector of honest, hard-working northern people who 
strongly identity with their local communities and who are 
threatened by undemocratic elites.
Northern autonomy
As we explained in the first chapter, the Lega Nord is a 
regionalist populist party, which has constantly campaigned 
for northern autonomy. Nearly one in five (17 per cent) of 
respondents had joined the Lega Nord because of its support 
for northern autonomy (other than those of Vlaams Belang in 
Belgium, no other PPAM supporters mentioned regional 
autonomy as a reason for support — unsurprisingly given that 
most other PPAMs are nationalist rather than regionalist). 
Answers from these respondents typically referred to the North 
being held back by an inefficient centralised state, wasteful 
public bodies and the burden of maintaining the South. Also 
mentioned was the importance of federalism in protecting the 
people’s identities, traditions and values:
Because it’s a movement aimed at reforming the state and is against 
centralisation; because it has given political credit to the productive 
North, because it is against a state that helps the South while robbing 
the North, and that, unfortunately, continues to do so without being 
able to resolve the real problems the South is facing. Paradoxically, I 
believe that the Lega’s political agenda is the only one that can 
liberate the South from its attitude of dependence.50 
Because of my ideals, or rather our ideals, that are: federalism and 
the suppression of useless public bodies, in order to eliminate the 
waste of public funds; annihilation, or rather destruction of all 
Mafia groups that are present in our territory.51
I think it is right that each people should have control of its own 
resources and be responsible for running its own region.52 
I support federalism and the defence of our traditions.53
Identity 
The fourth most common reason for joining the Lega Nord was 
‘identity’. Respondents referred to a love of their country, 
commitment to preservation of cultural values, or 
representation of the interests of ‘real’ countrymen. Typically, 
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The methodology employed for the collection and analysis of 
this data is set out in detail in The New Face of Digital Populism.58 
We therefore limit this section to Lega Nord specific issues.
For The New Face of Digital Populism we collected data 
from Facebook supporters of nationalist populist political 
parties or street-based movements drawn mainly across 
Western Europe. We ran a Facebook advert targeted at 
supporters of all parties and/or party leaders’ Facebook pages 
over the summer of 2011. Each advert invited Facebook 
supporters of the group in question to click on a link, which 
redirected them to our online survey.
Our campaign ran over a three-month period, with no 
single advert being available for more than six weeks. On 
clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital 
survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, which set 
out the details and purpose of the survey along with an 
invitation to take part. The size of target population varied 
from country to country, depending on the size of the 
Facebook membership of the group in question. Table 15 gives 
the details of the data collected for the survey on Lega Nord.
Table 15  Data collected for survey on Lega Nord
Date of 
survey
No of 
specific 
Facebook 
interest 
groups 
targeted
Size of 
population 
targeted
No of unique 
impressions
Total 
Facebook 
link clicks
Total 
surveys 
started
Final 
data 
set
Lega 
Nord
Jul–Aug 
2011
4 45,740 5,525,754 4,628 1,073 838
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methodological critique focusing on the nature of self-entry 
interest classification on Facebook, the lack of content 
reliability on social networking sites, and the lack of internet 
access and usage in the broader population, all of which are 
capable of biasing the results of the survey.
Therefore, we take care not to claim at any point in the 
text that our sample represents or reflects the official views of 
the group, or indeed of its offline membership.
Throughout the paper, we compare the Lega Nord 
Facebook survey results to the pan-European study results 
presented in The New Face of Digital Populism.
In the background chapter, we undertook a short 
literature review of Italian and English language material.
In chapter 2, we collected the gender and age of each of 
the groups in question directly from the publicly available 
Facebook group level data using the advertising tool 
mentioned above. This provides the most accurate results on 
the Facebook membership for each group. Results related to 
education, employment and involvement in the group are 
based on our weighted results.
In chapter 3 we give weighted results and provide 
comparative data where they are available from the 2008 
European Values Study or a Eurobarometer survey. Where the 
questions are not worded identically, or there were additional 
answer options, this is expressly identified.
Chapter 4 is based on the analysis of an open text 
question about why individuals joined the Lega Nord. This 
open question allowed respondents to answer as they wished. 
An Italian translator coded the responses. We reviewed the 
content of the responses and created nine main categories for 
the responses, with a tenth category ‘other’. Responses could 
fall into multiple categories.
Ethical considerations
As this research focused on adolescents over the age of 16, no 
Criminal Records Bureau check was necessary; 
consequently, none was sought. Similarly, it was not 
The ‘unique impressions’ column lists the number of unique 
occasions the advert was displayed on the target audience’s 
Facebook sidebar. The click per impression ratio was just under 
0.1 per cent, which is fairly consistent with the ratio for all 
groups surveyed for this research work. The click to survey 
completion ratio was around 20. This non-response rate may be 
the result of some respondents deciding not to take part in the 
survey on reading the consent form (in which further 
information was given about Demos and the survey). Our 
method to correct for non-response rates is discussed in the 
full methodology given in The New Face of Digital Populism. The 
size of the final data set was lower than the number of surveys 
completed because we removed incomplete surveys.
Data analysis and limitations
We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is a 
popular mode of communication for supporters of many of the 
groups and parties we surveyed.
In order to increase the validity of our results, we applied 
a post-stratification weight, using the known demographics of 
the online population to correct the sample’s balance of gender 
and age in line with the makeup of the group as a whole. To do 
this, we gathered background data on the composition of the 
Lega Nord’s Facebook group membership using Facebook’s 
advertising tool (which is freely available for any user to access). 
We gave each participant a weighted value on the basis of the 
prevalence of their demographic profile (age and gender) in the 
population at large. Although we achieved demographic 
representativeness — which can correct for systematic age or 
gender related bias — it is possible certain attitudinal self-
selection biases exist, because this was a self-select survey.  
It is with this caveat that the results are presented.
While the use of a post-stratification weight is an 
improvement on the use of unweighted data, it cannot be 
automatically claimed as a reliable basis for making 
inferences about the offline group. The use of social network 
surveys is subject to a well-known technical and 
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immediate withdrawal via a check box. No participants opted 
to withdraw in this way.
We observed ethical and legal considerations relevant to 
the storage and handling of data; all data were kept digitally 
encoded in an anonymous format, and we did not store any 
data capable of identifying any participants.
We prepared for the eventuality that the research 
uncovered information with serious security implications, 
particularly relating to participant support for violence; we 
took precautions to absolve the researcher of moral 
responsibility towards the disclosure of information to agents 
of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the survey did 
not ask for precise details of acts of violence or illegal political 
protest. In order to preserve participant confidentiality (the 
deliberate exclusion by data capture systems of IP addresses) 
we removed from the researcher the means to identify and 
incriminate individual participants.
necessary for us to obtain informed consent from participant 
parents or guardians as Social Research Association ethics 
guidelines suggest such clearance should not be sought and 
is not required where investigating participants aged over 16. 
We sought and gained individual informed consent from all 
participants, who agreed to a consent statement presented at 
the start of the survey — failure to sign acceptance of this 
statement prevented them from participating further in the 
research. Although we targeted the survey only at people 
aged over 16, a small number of individuals stated they were 
under 16 when responding to the question about age. We 
immediately deleted data relating to these people.
We stated on the Facebook advert that we were 
representing Demos, and were undertaking a survey of 
Facebook members of the group in question. On clicking the 
advertisement link, the participant was redirected to the 
survey landing page. On that page we pointed out that leaders 
of each group had been informed about the survey. Before 
running the survey, Demos emailed each of the groups in 
question to let them know about the survey. On the landing 
page we also stated that we would be letting the party in 
question know about the results before they were made public. 
Before release, we emailed the parties and groups in question 
with the results where they pertained to their members.
We did not brief participants fully on the study’s aims 
before completing the survey in order to avoid the exhibition 
of demand characteristics. We provided only a broad overview 
of the research at the start of the survey, and gave more 
detailed information on the project’s aims only after the last 
question had been completed. We provided the contact details 
of the lead researcher to all participants to cover the 
eventuality that they had questions not covered by the debrief 
notes, but few participants made use of it.
We told participants that they could withdraw from the 
research at any time before completion, as part of a preface 
presented alongside the consent statement. Later we reminded 
them of this right when they completed the survey via a 
paragraph in the debrief notes, offering the possibility of 
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34 Respondents to the Demos survey and Standard 
Eurobarometer 76 were asked: ‘What does the European 
Union mean to you personally?’ Respondents were allowed 
to select multiple options.
35 Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of 
respondents who selected either the option ‘Freedom to 
travel’ or the option ‘Study and work anywhere in the 
EU’. The Standard Eurobarometer 76 figure provided is 
the percentage of respondents who selected the option 
‘Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU’.
36 Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of 
respondents who selected the option ‘loss of cultural and 
national identity’. The Standard Eurobarometer 76 figure 
provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the 
option ‘loss of cultural identity’.
37 Bartlett et al, The New Face of Digital Populism 
38 See Albertazzi and McDonnell, Populists in Power.
39 Demos survey respondents were asked: ‘To what extent 
do you trust the following: [institution]’. Eurobarometer 
respondents were asked: ‘For each of the following 
institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not 
to trust it. [institution]’. In each case respondents selected 
either ‘tend to trust’ or ‘tend not to trust’. The percentages 
cited for ‘Political parties’, and ‘The press’ are derived from 
Standard Eurobarometer 76 (November 2011) QA10. The 
percentages cited for ‘Government’ and ‘European Union’ 
are taken from Standard Eurobarometer 75 (May 2011), Spring 
Wave, QA13.1 and QA13.3. The percentages cited for all 
other institution are derived from Standard Eurobarometer 74 
(November 2010), QA12ab combined, as they do not appear 
in the later survey.
27 Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of 
respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘Have you 
taken part in a political march, protest, or demonstration in 
the last six months’. European Social Survey (Round 5) 
 figure provided is the percentage of respondents who 
answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘During the last 12 months, 
have you done any of the following? Have you taken part in 
a lawful public demonstration?’ The European Value Survey 
from 2008 states that 37.8 per cent of the Italian public have 
participated in ‘authorised events’. 
28 Demos survey respondents were asked ‘Please rank your 
three biggest concerns in order of importance from the 
list below’. They were able to provide a maximum of 
three responses. The Demos survey figure provided is the 
percentage of survey respondents who ranked the relevant 
concern as their first or second biggest concern.
29 Question A6a1 in the survey by the European Commission, 
‘Public opinion in the European Union [November 2011]: 
table of results’, Standard Eurobarometer 76, autumn 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/
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(accessed 24 Sep 2012) (Standard Eurobarometer 76).
30 Standard Eurobarometer 76. Islamic Extremism is not 
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32 Respondents to the Demos survey and Standard Eurobarometer 
76 were asked: ‘Will the next 12 months be better, worse or the 
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33 Standard Eurobarometer 76, question 12.
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47 ‘Perchè è ora che l’italia sia più libera da tutti gli extracomunitari 
che ogni giorno ci tolgono lavoro e non è vero che gli italiani 
non vogliono fare certi lavori perchè conosco tante persone che 
pagherebbero per lavorare anche a raccogliere il letame.’
48 ‘Non voglio gli immigrati nel MIO paese sono troppi.’
49 ‘Perchè non voglio più che gli extra comunitari ci rubino il lavoro!’
50 ‘Perchè è un movimento riformatore dello Stato, antistatalista, 
perchè ha dato valenza politica al Nord produttivo, perchè è 
contro uno stato meridionalista che ha depredato il Nord e che 
purtroppo continua a farlo senza riuscire a risolvere i problemi 
del Sud. Paradossalmente credo che la politica della Lega sia 
l’unica che possa affrancare il Sud dall’assistenzialismo.’
51 ‘I miei ideali,anzi i nostri ideali sono:federalismo e soppressione 
degli enti locali inutili per eliminare lo spreco di denaro 
pubblico — annientamento,anzi distruzione di tutte le mafie 
esistenti sul nostro territorio.’
52 ‘Penso sia giusto che ogni popolo gestisca le proprie risorse  
e programmi il proprio territorio.’
53 ‘Perchè sono un sostenitore del federalismo e della tutela delle 
nostre tradizioni.’
54 ‘Attualmente è l’unico partito che rappresenta i valori del popolo 
senza rinnegare le identità e le tradizioni nazionali.’
55 ‘Perchè è il partito che tiene vive le identità locali rispettanto e 
favorendo tradizioni centenarie che permettono al nostro paese  
di distinguersi dagli altri per eccellenza.’
56 ‘Perchè voglio supportare un partito che agisce come lobby del 
nord e difende l’identità della mia gente.’
40 Demos survey respondents were asked whether they trusted 
‘The mainstream media’. Eurobarometer respondents were 
asked whether they trusted ‘The press’.
41 Demos survey respondents were asked: ‘To what extent 
do you agree with the following statement: ‘In general, 
most people cannot be trusted.’’ Respondents were 
able to select any one of the following options: ‘agree 
entirely’, ‘agree a little’, disagree entirely’, ‘disagree a 
little’ or ‘neutral’. The Demos survey figures provided are 
the percentages of respondents who selected ‘disagree 
entirely’ or ’disagree a little’, or selected ‘agree entirely’ or 
‘agree a little’. The national statistics provided are drawn 
from Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences, European 
Values Study, 2008, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.
jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5 
(accessed 19 Sep 2012). Respondents who took part in the 
EVS were asked: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful 
in dealing with people?’ Respondents were able to select any 
one of the following options: ‘most people can be trusted’, 
‘cannot be too careful’ or ‘don’t know’. The EVS figures 
provided are the percentages of respondents who selected 
‘most people can be trusted’ and ‘cannot be too careful’.
42 ‘Perchè si avvicina alle mie idee e sopratutto è l’unico partito  
che sembra voler agire per migliorare le condizioni del paese.’
43 ‘Unico partito fortemente legato al territorio e ai suoi elettori.’
44 ‘Mi piace il carisma di Bossi e condivido le ideologie.’
45 ‘Perchè condivido le idee per cui si batte la lega quali federalismo 
e lotta contro gli immigrati senza permesso di soggiorno!’
46 ‘Perchè sono stanco di vedere il mio paese distrutto da chi nn vi è 
nato, di vedere i miei fratelli impauriti da chi abbiamo accolto.’
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57 ‘Perche’ e’ un Partito che da’ VERAMENTE voce al semplice 
cittadino.’
58 Bartlett et al, The New Face of Digital Populism.
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a 'Collective Work' means a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology or encyclopedia, in 
which the Work in its entirety in unmodified form, along with a number of other contributions, 
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective 
whole. A work that constitutes a Collective Work will not be considered a Derivative Work (as 
defined below) for the purposes of this Licence.
b 'Derivative Work' means a work based upon the Work or upon the Work and other pre-
existing works, such as a musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which the Work may be recast, transformed, or adapted, except that a work that constitutes 
a Collective Work or a translation from English into another language will not be considered 
a Derivative Work for the purpose of this Licence.
c 'Licensor' means the individual or entity that offers the Work under the terms of this Licence.
d 'Original Author' means the individual or entity who created the Work.
e 'Work' means the copyrightable work of authorship offered under the terms of this Licence.
f 'You' means an individual or entity exercising rights under this Licence who has not previously 
violated the terms of this Licence with respect to the Work,or who has received express 
permission from Demos to exercise rights under this Licence despite a previous violation.
2 Fair Use Rights
 Nothing in this licence is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use, 
first sale or other limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under copyright law 
or other applicable laws.
3 Licence Grant
 Subject to the terms and conditions of this Licence, Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, 
royalty-free, non-exclusive,perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) licence to 
exercise the rights in the Work as stated below: 
a  to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, and to 
reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works;
b  to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly,perform publicly, and perform 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as incorporated in 
Collective Works; The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now 
known or hereafter devised.The above rights include the right to make such modifications 
as are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. All rights not 
expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved.
4 Restrictions
 The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited  
by the following restrictions:
a You may distribute,publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the 
Work only under the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the Uniform 
Resource Identifier for, this Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You 
distribute, publicly display,publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform.You may not 
offer or impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms of this Licence or the 
recipients’ exercise of the rights granted hereunder.You may not sublicence the Work.You 
must keep intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of warranties.
You may not distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the 
Work with any technological measures that control access or use of the Work in a manner 
inconsistent with the terms of this Licence Agreement.The above applies to the Work as 
incorporated in a Collective Work, but this does not require the Collective Work apart from 
the Work itself to be made subject to the terms of this Licence. If You create a Collective 
Work, upon notice from any Licencor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the 
Collective Work any reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested.
b You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner 
that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary 
compensation.The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital 
Demos — Licence to Publish
Nationalist populist parties and movements are growing in 
support throughout Europe. These groups are known for 
their opposition to immigration, their ‘anti-establishment’ 
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